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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THELMA MADSEN, and DIANA
LYNN MADSEN, an infant, by
Thelma Madsen, her parent
and natural guardian,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 233142 J-:),_-)j

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE
BOARD OF CORRECTIONS, SAMUEL
H. SMITH, LEON HATCH, TAGE
SPONBECK and DOE I THROUGH
DOE V,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the wife and infant child of
Thomas Madsen for his wrongful death.

The Plaintiffs-

Appellants claim that the Defendants-Respondents were
negligent in their actions tm.;ard Thomas Madsen, thereby
causing his death.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court granted Defendants' motion to
dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claim was barred
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellants seek to have the order dismissing
Plaintiffs' complaint reversed and the case remanded to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-1Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

to the lower court for trial.
STATKMENT OF THE FACTS

On March l,

1974 Thomas B.

Ma~sen

was an inmate,

incarcerated at the Utah State Prison at the point of the
mountain.

During some months prior to that date, Mr. Madsen

had been repeatedly approached by prison officials and
encouraged to undergo plastic surgery for a facial lift
at the prison hospital.

After numerous requests Mr.

~adsen

had consented to that operation which was performed on the
morning of March 1, 1974.

Prior to the operation Mr. Madsen

was given a shot of morphine, and he received another morphir
shot following the operation.

For some time Mr. Madsen had

suffered from a heart ailment which fact was known or
reason~bly

could and should have been know to the prison

officials.
After the operation, Mr. Madsen was placed in a
hospital room to recover
and surgery.

from the effects of the anesthesia

At approximately 6:00 or 6:30p.m. of that

d~

Mr. Madsen was discovered by another inmate by the name of
Ron Bergeron to be having trouble breathing.

Mr. Bergeron

then went to the prison hospital medical technician and
advised him that Mr. Madsen was having difficulty breathing
and suggested that Mr.

~adsen

may need to go by way of

ambulance to the University of Utah Medical Center for medico
treatment.

The medical technician, whose name is at this tir

unknown to appellants,

responded that there was nothing wronc

with Mr. Madsen that in fact, Mr. Ma~sen was a hypochondriac.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Approximately one hour later, another inmate working at
the prison hospital at that time by the name of Thomas
Brough observed Mr. Madsen to be having difficulty breathing
to a critical extent.

Mr. Brough then notified the prison

medical technician, apparently, the same individual, that
Mr. Madsen appeared to be in great difficulty and perhaps
was dying.

Approximately five minutes later between 7:30

and 8:00 p.m. the medical technician examined Mr. Madsen
and then summoned an

ambulance and notified the prison

doctor.

The technician also attempted to give Mr. Madsen

oxygen.

However, the oxygen tanks apparently were not

functioning and would not fit through the door to where
Mr. Madsen was.

Approximately forty five minutes later

the ambulance arrived and transported Mr. Madsen to the
University of Utah Medical Center where he was pronounced
dead on arrival.

An autopsy was later performed on the body of
Thomas Madsen and the findings were basically that Thomas
Madsen had suffered a heart attack while at the prison
hospital facility and that the heart attack was the direct
cause of death.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
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l\RGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL II1MUNITY ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIT~D
STATES AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, THEREFORE,
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING IT Il'J THE PRESENT CASE.
A.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 63-30-10 (10) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LA\"1 UNDER
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES AND ARTICLE I, §24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
In order for a legislatively-enacted statute to meet
the Constitutional test for validity, it is required that it
apply to all persons within the class with which it seeks

~

deal equally, both upon the face of the statute itself and in
application.
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the Stati
of Utah also incorporates such premise:
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation."
It is Appellants' contention that Section 63-30-10(10:
Utah Code .I\J1notated, fails to meet those specified Constituti
requirements.

Section 63-30-10 (10) denies an action against

the State by one who has suffered an injury as a result of
"incarceration".

~

As a matter of application and operation~

the present case, one injured in a prison hospital will be
denied his claim, although,

if he had been injured in any

other government operated hospital in the State, he would ha'.
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been allowed access to the courts to prosecute his cla~m.
Such is true though the functions and the risks inherent in
the operation of both of the hospitals are the same.

The

result is a denial of equal protection of the law and a nonuniform operation of this law.
While Appellants concede that those incarcerated in
a state prison have more limited rights than those who are
not, one right must remain inviolate, even to prisoners, in
the absence of a court-ordered execution--the right to life.
That right is fundamental and guaranteed to all, whether
incarcerated or not.

In regards to application of the equal

protection clause of the United States Constitution, the

u.

S.

Supreme Court has adopted a rigorous policy of "strict scrutiny"
in cases dealing with the restriction of a "fundamental right".
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 282 Fed. Supp. 70 (E.D.
N. Y. 1969).

Such scrutiny must then be applied to the pre-

sent case.
This Court has also established standards by which a
legislative act should be judged when it applies unequally to
persons in the same circumstances:
... to be unconstitutional the discrimination
must be unreasonable or arbitrary. A classification
is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion
or exclusion features so long as there is some basis
for the differentiation between classes or subject
matters included as compared to those excluded from
its operation, provided the differentiation bears.a
reasonable relation to the purposes to be accompl1shed
by the act.
State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 70 P. 2d,
923 (1938).
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The classification must bear a reasonable relation
to the purposes to be accomplished by the act.

The object or

purpose of the act is the touchstone for determining whether
the act is constitutional or unconstitutional.
at 507.

§_~ate

v.~

The same test is employed by the United States Suprec

Court in determining a violation of the Equal Protection Clauo
of the Fourteenth Amendment when a suspect classification is
not involved.

"A Century of Supreme Court adjudication under

the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires
that the State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes."

San Antonio

Indepen~

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36
L. Ed. 2d 56 (1973).
The Supreme Court of Kansas recently applied these tes·
to the Kansas Governmental Irnrnuni ty Act Brown v. Hi chi ta State
University, 217 Kan. 279, 540 P. 2d. 66

(1975).

"As the guardian of the principles embodied
in the Constitutions, it is within our inherent power,
and our duty, to determine the constitutionality of
the legislation in question." Brown at 80.
The Kansas Court then went on to strike down the class:
fication created by the State's legislators because the object:
of the statute-convience-was not a rational basis for the clas
fication and even if it was, it could not outweigh an individc:
constitutional rights.

In this regard, it said:

No doubt the absolute monarchs of the past,
and the dictators of today, refused and still refuse
to be charged with wrong, but that is no reason why
our representative and democratic forms of government .
should be so classified. We think the rule was adopted
Sponsored by the S.J.
Law Library.
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We do not subscribe to the belief that con-

v~n~ence is a pervasive legislative objective suf-

flclent to totally deprive the appellants access
to the courts.
Convenience is completely unacceptable as a standard by which to balance the rights
of the state.
Convenience should not outweigh an
individual's right to be compensated for actual
damages sustained and injuries suffered. To hold
conv~n~ence is.a permissible legislative objective,
sufflclent to lnsulate the government from negligence, is to engage in incredulous reasoning, void
of logic, which undermines the very principles upon
which this nation was founded.
Brown at 82,82.
(Citations omitted)
In Kansas one injured by governmental entity was classified solely by the type of governmental entity involved.
Their right to redress and remedies available, if any, were
dependent solely upon this classification.

Similar inequities

are involved in the present case.
Legislative history and judicial opinion provide ample
evidence that the purpose behind the statutory section in
question here was to prevent prisoners from continually harrassing official personnel with lawsuits and to prevent actions
against the State for injuries inflicted by one inmate upon
another.

Senate Journal of 1965, pp. 136-37; Shefield v.

Turner, 21 Utah 2nd 314, 445 P. 2nd 367 (1968).
In application, the section in question allows a cause
of action according to which class the prisoner falls in.

If

he is a prisoner who receives treatment within the prison hospital, then a cause of action for any injuries sustained as a
result of that treatment is denied.

If he is a prisoner who

has received injuries as a result of treatment at another
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hospital facility, his cause of action is preserved.

Under

close analyzation of the purposes of Section 63-30-10(10),

~

is Appellants' contention that there is no reasonable relatior
between such purposes and the classification which is i!Tlposed
by the application of the Act.

As such, the statute in ques-

tion, Section 63-30-10 (10), Utah Code Annotated, is in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the
tution of the State of Utah and is, therefore,

Canst~

unconstituti~

Being unconstitutional, the lower Court erred in applying it
to the present case.
B.
PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THAT AN ENTITY BE RESPONSIBL:
FOR ITS NEGLIGENT ACTS.
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT I!
CONTRARY TO SUCH POLICY AND SHOULD BE TOTALLY ABROGATED.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act had its genesis in
the English Common Law Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.

Many

courts have stated that sovereign immunity was founded on the
proposition that the "king could do no wrong."

In reality,

however, it was not that the king could do no wrong, he was
just privileged to do wrong and not be held accountable for
it in his own courts.

In Driggs v. Utah State Teacher Retire·

ment Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.

2d 657 (1943) the Utah Supre'

Court, in an opinion by then District Judge Crockett criticiz'
this foundation of sovereign immunity:
The idea that the King could do no wrong
was merely a fictional concept without any righteous basis in law or logic.
It arose out of the
desire of the king and those holding favored positions under him to impose their will upon those
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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who were less privileged. This antiquated idea has
certainly never had any place in American jurisprudence.
The more rational approach to the notion of
sovereign immunity was indicated by Blackstone, 1
Bl. Comm: 2 41, 2 4 2:
"The law ascribed to the king
the attr1bute of sovereignity. He is a sovereign
and independent within his own dominions, and he
owes no kind of subjection to any other kind of
potentate upon earth.
Hence, it is that no suit or
action can be brought against the king, even in
civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him; for all jurisdiction implies superiority of power.
It was thought an anomaly that the king should
have jurisdiction over himself, and that he could be
asked to make himself do something.
In our government of three separate branches, this paradox does
not exist.
There is no reason why the judiciary in
its proper function as an independent branch of the
government should not be asked to adjudicate the
rights of individuals against the other branches
of the government, or even as against the judiciary
itself.
Driggs at 658.
Sovereign immunity was imported to America by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester,
9 Mass. 247 (1912).

That court held that even though the town

was incorporated, had a treasury out of which a judgment could
be satisfied and had a means of taxation which could replenish
the town's treasury; the town was immune from suit for its
tortious wrongs, wrongfully citing the old English case, Russel
v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep.
port.

362, 2 T.R. 673 (1788) for sup-

The Russel case involved a suit against all the inhabi-

tants of a country for damages occurring to Russel's wagon
by reason of a bridge being out of repair.

The Court disallowed
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the action primarily on the yrounds that there 1vas no fund
out of which any judyment could be paid

~nd

''it is better

that an individual should sustain an injury than that the
public should suffer an inconvenience". Russel at 3G3.
Commenting on this case the Minnesota Supreme Court
said:
There is no mention of "the king can oo no
wrong", but on the contrary it is suggested that
the Plaintiff sue the county itself rather than
the individual inhabitants.
Every reason assiyned
by the Court is born out of expediency.
The wrong
to Plaintiff is submerged in the convience of the
public.
No moral, ethical, or rational reason
for the decision is advanced by the Court except
the practical problem of assessing damages against
individual defendants ... " It was on this shaky
foundation that the law of governmental tort immunity was erected in Minnesota and elsewhere.
Spanel v. Mounds View School District No. 621,
264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W. 2d 795, 197 (1962).
Some courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have
justified governmental immunity on these same grounds; see
Hurst v. Highway Department, 16 Utah 2d 153, 397 P.2d 71
(1964).

However, the statistical data simply does not

support this fear that governmental functions would be curtailed by allowing citizens to sue their government.

Even

as early as 1959, it was apparent that this was not a
rational basis for governmental immunity.
Figures actually compiled showing the
claims experience in typical cities show that
the spectre of the crippling judgment, as a
deterrent to abrogation of procedural or substantive immunities, so far as not materialized
in any great degree.
The force of the "crippling
judgment" may be vitiated by se]f insurance or
commercial insurance.
So far as knovm,
municipal insolvency proceedings in the federal
courts have not occurred because of tort judgments.
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David, "Tort Liability of Local Government:
Alternatives to Immunity from Suit or Liability,"
6 u.c.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1959) .
.These original purposes of sovereign immunity; to
protect the feudal lord from suit in his own court, to protect local government from the numerous feared suits, and
to protect the state from feared insolvency, are contrary
to one of the most fundamental principles of civilized
society:

that if a person or his property is wrongfully

injured he should be able to seek reasonable compensation
and relief from the wrongdoer.

It is because the doctrine

of sovereign immunity is contrary to this fundamental principle that the governmental proprietary distinction developed.
This principle is designed to mitigate the harsh effects of
sovereign immunity and allow relief in certain cases.
the difficulty is in applying the distinction.

However,

Usually, the

results are inconsistent and illogical, often arbitrary and
harsh, as exception after exception developed to the rule
that government could not be sued in governmental matters.
Utah is no exception to this trend; history is replete with
the Utah Court making fine distrinctions which do not promote
justice or the purpose of governmental immunity.
The Utah Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine
in Gillmore v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 180, 89P. 714 (1907).
That case involved an action for trespass to Plaintiff's
property while police officers were searching the Jordan
River for a dead body.

In ruling against the Plaintiff the

Court
said,
"It Law
seems
that
the
any
event,
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engaged in the discharge of a public duty as agent of the
sovereign state, its creator,

. the City, in the absence

of a special statute, cannot be held responsible for the
acts of police officers, and certainly not strangers."
A year later the court recognized an exception to
Gillmore.

The Court held that a city, maintaining a water

works system supplying water to its residents, acts in a
proprietary capacity and is liable for any acts committed while
supplying the water to the same extent as any private owner
Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P.570

would be.
(1908).

From Brown and Gillmor to the present time, the
Court has struggled with governmental immunity and its exceptions.

The Court has held there is immunity in cases

concerning:

flood waters from a state constructed reservoir

1

and canal , operation of a fire truck on city streets,

2

injuries resulting from burns received from a school incin3

erator , injuries from burns received in a community recreation area

4

5

, operation of a municipal golf course , an air6

7

port waiting room , sewer , operation of a state owned gravel

~l'lilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 (1913) ·
Rollow v. Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P.791 (1926).
3 Blngham v. Board of Education of Ogden, 118 Utah
582, 223 4 P.2d 432 (1950).
Ramierez v. Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d
463, (19')5).
5Jopes v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 297, 343 p.2d
728 (1956).
Wade v. Salt Lake City, 10 Utah 2d 374, 353 P.2d
914 (1960).
7cobiar v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P.2d 986
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8
pit , and maintenance of a sewage disposal system9
During the same period that Court held there is no
immunity in cases concerning:

injuries resulting from the
10

maintenance of public streets ; the maintenance of a public
11
nuisance
the maintenance of an attractive nuisance 12 ,
·
·
··
opera t 1·o n o f b at h h ouses an d sw1mm1ng
poo 1 s 13 , mun1c1pal
water
14
works
, and flooding from a municipal reservoir 15
This brief look at the history of governmental immunity shows the arbitrariness involved in its application.
The decisions do not seem to further the purpose of the
doctrine; they tend only to show its lack of rationality.
There seems to be no reasonable relationship between the
particular classification and the supposed purpose of
sovereign immunity.

What discernable difference can there

be between the operation of municipal golf course and a
municipally operated swimming pool?

Yet, the Court has held

that immunity exists for the golf course
.
.
. 17
sw1mm1ng pool operat1on

16

, but not for the

Clearly the distinction operates

8 Hurst v. Highway Department, 16 Utah 2d 153, 397
P.2d 71 F964).
Johnson v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitation
District 20 Utah 2d 389, 438 P.2d 706 (1968).
6Rollow v. Ogden City, Note 2.
llRollow, Note 2.
12 Brawn-v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570
(1908). 3
1 Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 P.444
(1926) "14
Brown, Note 12.
15Ne5tffian v. south Davis county Water Improvement Dis~rict, 16 Utah 2d 198, 398 P.2d 203 (1965}.
16Jopes, Note 5, supra.
1 7 BUrEOn,
Note
13,
supra.
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unequally as to people in similar circumstances.
In 1965, the Utah Legislature adopted the Governmental Immunity Act.

The act had two main purposes.

In some

areas it maintained the arbitrary governmental proprietary
distinction based on the groundless fear that government still
needed to be protected.

In other areas its express purpose

was to restrict or even waive immunity altogether.

Utah

chose to act legislatively against this anachronistic
doctrine while other states have been in the process of
judicially changing this harsh rule of the 18th Century.
Almost a majority of states have now abolished or severly
restricted the doctrine of governmental immunity.
Brown v. 1'/ichita State University, supra.

See, e.g.,

Nieting v. Blondell,

235 N.W.3d 597 (Minn. 1975); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.
2d 832

(W.Va. 1975); Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public

Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A. 2d 877 (1973); Spencer v. General
Hospital of District of Columbia, 138 U.S App. D.C. 48, 425
F.2d 479

(1969); Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. 1972);

Flournoy v. School Dist. No. 1, 174 Colo. 110, 482, P.2d 966
(1971); Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937

(1970);

Willis v. Department of Conservation and Econ. Dev., 55 N.J.
534, A.2d 34

(1970); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261

A.2d 896 (1970); General Laws of Rhode Island §9-31-1;
v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805

~

(1968); ~~

v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Beac:_h_v__._~
of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335
of Lexington,

386 S.W.2d 738

(1967); Haney v. city

(Ky. 1964); Sherbutt'=-v. _ __Marin~
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~ity,

374 Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920 (1964); Rice v. Clark

county, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605 (1963); Scheele v. City of
~chorage,

385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963); Muskopf v. Corning

Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal~ Rrtr. 80, 359 P.2d
457 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No.
l~·

18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Hargrove v. Town of

Cocoa Beach, 96 S.2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M.
588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975); Wolfe v. Town of Bradford, 22 Conn.
Sup. 239, 167 A.2d 924

(1961); Hamilton v. City of Shreveport,

247 La. 784, 174 So.2d 529 (1965); Tennessee Department of
Mental Health v. Hughes, 531 S.\1.2d 299 (Tenn. 1975); State
Highway Department v. Pinder, 531 S.W. 2d 857 (Texas 1975);
Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 407 P.2d
440 (Wash. 1965); Iowa Code Annotated, Section 25A-l et seq.;
Noll v. City of Bozeman, 534 P.2d 880 (Mont. 1975); Oregon
Revised Statutes, Section 30.265-285; New York Consolidated
Statutes, Section l0b-6(b); Rodriguez v. State, 52 Haw. 156,
472 P.2d 509

(1970), Hawaii Revised Statutes, Section 662-2,

15 (1).
Court opinions and legal writings demonstrate that
there are no reasonable justifications for the continuation of
this doctrine which imposes such severe hardship and economic
loss on the citizens of this State.
Utah's neighboring states have abolished the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.

The Supreme Court of Arizona has said,
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"We are of the opinion that when the rc•.-1,oon
for a certain rule no longer exists, the rule itself should be aban~oned.
After a thorough rcexamination_of_t~e rule of governmental immunity
from tort llablllty, we now hold that it must be
discarded as a rule of law in Arizona and all prior
decisions to the contrary are hereby overruled."
-?_tone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz.
3 eT;- 3 s1 P. 2 a

Tif7~--rcf9---n. %-3l

.-

-

The Idaho Supreme Court in severely restricting
sovereign immunity in that state has said,

"It is unguestion·

able that lhere is an established trend discrediting the
doctrine of sovereign immunity."
795,

473 P.2d 937,

943

-?_m~_th_ _'1_.__5_!:ate,

93 Tdaho

(1970).

Justice Traynor, in a landmark California decision,
had this to say concerning the governmental immunity:
After a re-evaluation of the governmental
immunity from tort liability we have concluded
that it must be discarded as mistaken and unjust.
The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an
anachronism, without rational basis, and has
existed only by the force of inertia.
. None
of the reasons for its continuance can withstand
analysis.
No one defends total governmental
immunity.
In fact, it docs not exist.
It has
become riddled with exceptions, both legislative
and judicial.
. and the exceptions operate so
illogically as to cause serious inequality.
Some
who are injured by governmental agencies can recover,
others cannot:
one injured while attending a community theater in a public park may recover.
but one injured in a children's playground may not.
for torts committed in the course of a governmental
function" there is no liability, unless the tort
be classified as a nuisance.
Muskopf v. Corning
Hospital District, 359 P. 2d 4 57-( 196-iT.--( c-fta-tTons
ommitted).
--In a very strongly worded opinion, the New Mexico
Supreme Court responded to its first opportunity to discard
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the anachronistic doctrine.
"Several times in the recent past this
court has cast aspe~sions upon sovereign immunity.
but unfortunately, ln those cases, the issue was
not squarely before us as it is today. Thus,
we take this opportunity to rid the State of this
legal anachronism.
Common law sovereign immunity
may no longer be interposed as a defense by the
State, or any of its political subdivisions, in
tort actions . . . It can no longer be justified
by existing circumstances and has long been devoid
of any valld Justification.
We recognize that this is a far-reaching
decision which, at first blush, does violence to
the doctrine of stare decisis. However, we do
not feel that stare decisis should be used to perpetuate the harsh and unjust results which blind
adherence to sovereign immunity rules mandated."
Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
(Emphasis added.)
The Court also rejected the rational of Russell v.
Men of Devon, supra, as "an anachronism in the law of today. "
Id. at 1156.
On the basis of the aforementioned authority, Appellants conclude that the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity has lost its underpinnings by the social and governmental change which have occurred.

In today's world, we cannot

discount the extent of governmental intervention and actions
which affect the conduct of human affairs.

This view was

expressed with great clarity by Justice Cardozo in the following words:
"A rule which in its origins was the creation
of the courts themselves, and was supposed in the
making to express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by the courst when the mores have so changed
that perpetuation of the rule would do violence to
the social conscience." Cardozo, The Growth of the
Law,
pp. 136-37 (1924).
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Tort liability is grounded in lhe concept that an
individual, or any entity, should he rcsuonsible for injuries
occasioned by his/her/its negligent acts.

While valid pur-

poses may have once existed for the creation of the doctrine
of governmental immunity, the reasons for the adoption of the
doctrine have long since disappeared.

Appellants

agn~e

with

the view suggested by Justice Cardozo, that when the reason
for a judicially-created rule

disappears, the Court is not

only empowered to abrogate the rule, but has a duty to do so.
Appellants urge the Court to follow the trend established by
Utah's neighboring states and return the state of the law in
Utah to that which is promulgated by the public policy surrounding the very concept of liability in tort.
POINT II
APPELLANTS' CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ARISE OUT OF
INCARCERATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
63-30-10 (10)
Section 63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated provides that
immunity from suit for all governmental entities is waived
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omissioo
of an employee committed within the scope of his employment.
If this provisions were to go no further,

there could be no

serious contention that governmental immunity has not been
waived with respect to the case at bar.

However, Section

63-30-10 goes on to provide a series of exceptions to the
waiver of immunity, and it specifically provides for an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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exception from the waiver if the injury arises out of the incarceration of any person in any State prison or other place
of "legal confinement."

It is conceded by Appellants that

Appellants' decedent was legally confined in a State Prison at
the time of his death.

The issue then becomes whether or not

the injury to Appellants' decedent, which ultimately caused
his death, did in fact "arise out of his incarceration."
Respondents contend that any injury arising from any
function associated with operation of a prison must be construed
as arising from the incarceration.

Appellants assert, however,

that if the broad interpretation insisted upon by the defendant
is given the statute, there could never be any waiver of immunity on the part of the State for any injury which was connected in any way with a prisoner or prison.

Surely the legis-

lature intended to waive immunity in some instances and did
not intend that this subsection be interpreted so broadly so
as to eliminate that very waiver.

Such construction would

seem to limit a cause of action against the prison to a visitor
who was injured by the accidental discharge of a guard's
weapon, simply because he was visiting a person who was "incarcerated" within the meaning of the statute.
Judicial construction of Section 63-30-10(10) Utah Code
Annotated is limited at best.

In 1968, the Utah Supreme Court

decided· the case of Sheffield v. Turner, supra, in which the
Plaintiff Sheffield, who had been an inmate at the Utah State
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Prison, sued the State of Utah and the prison warden for
damages resulting from an alte~cation between the Plaintiff
and another prisoner in which the Plaintiff was stabbed in
his eye.

In that case, the District Court granted the

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss based on Section 63-30-10(10)
holding that plaintiff's injury arose out of his
at a state prison.

incarcerati~

On appeal, the Plaintiff contested the

dismissal only as to the prison warden, but the Utah Supreme
Court commented on the dismissal as to the State of Utah as
follows:
"Inasmuch as the statute just referred to
(63-30-10(10) plainly retains sovereign immunity
to the State for any injury arising out of incarceration in the prison, the trial court correctly
dismissed the complaint as to it."
The Sheffield case, however, is not as helpful as
it may seem because it is clearly distinguishable from the
facts of the case at bar.

In Sheffield, the plaintiff was,

as mentioned, injured by a fellow prisoner.

In this case,

Appellants' decedant, Thomas Madsen, was not injured by a
fellow prisoner nor was his injury caused by any other
activity closely associated with the operation of a prison,
but his injury was caused by the negligent operation of a
hospital facility and by the negligent hospital personnel.
Another Utah case dealing with Section 63-30-10(10)
Utah Code Annotated is that of Emery__':'_-_State, 26 U.2d l,
483 P.2d 1296,

(1971).

In the Emery case, the issue decided

by the Utah Supreme Court was whether or not a State Hospita~
The ic;sue

qualified
as Law
another
place
of provided
legal
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of what constitutes an injury arising out of incarceration
was not raised, therefore, the Emery case is not helpful
to us on that issue.
It is an accepted principal of law in Utah that where
a particular statutory phrase has been used in the past by the
State Legislature and has been construed in the past by the
Courts, it is to be assumed that the legislature is aware of
the judicial construction of that phrase and that when that
language is used by future legislatures it is used advisedly.
See Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 533 P.2d 799 at 801,

(1975).

With that principal in mind, Plaintiffs direct the Court's
attention to Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated providing
that workman's compensation is available to employees who are
killed or injured by accidents "arising out of" or in the
course of their employment.

Under the workman's compensation

statute, the phrase "arising out of" has been construed in a
number of cases to require a close causal connection between
the employee's employment and the injury he suffers.

The

case of Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 72
L.Ed. 507, 48 S.Ct. 221, 66 ALR 1402,

(1928), affirming 68

U. 600, 251 P. 555, is particularly illustrative.

In that

case the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
phrase arising out of as contained in the Utah statute meant
that liability would be imposed if there were a close causal
connection between the injury and the employment in which the
employee was then engaged and which substantially contributed
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to the injury.

It appears well established in Utah that

before a causal connection can be established under the
phrase arising out of, it must be shown that the injury
resulted from a risk to which the injured person was subjected by his employment.

See Andreason et al v. Industrial

Commission et al, 98 Utah 551, 100 P.2d 202,

(1940).

In the lower court, the respondents relied
heavily upon Justice Crockett's language in
State, 546 P.2d 242

Eptin9~

(1976), for the alleged premise that

where a prisoner is still under control of prison authoritie
incidents thereto "arise out of the incarceration."

Res-

pondents' reliance would seem to be mis-placed in that
Justice Crockett was speaking as to whether inmate Hart's
conduct arose out of the incarceration.

The language of

the statute requires that the injury result from the incarce·
ation.

There is no requirement of a causal link between the

conduct of the agent committing the negligent act and the
incarceration, but between the injury and the incarceration.
The Utah Courts have always applied the close causal connection definition of this phrase rather strictly requiring
more to be shown that simply that the injury occured "in
See M & K Corporation v.

the course of" the employment.
Industrial Commission, 112 U.

488, 189 P. 2d 132,

(1948) ·

According to the principal of law above enunciated,
this Court must assume that the Utah Legislature knew the
construction which has been applied to the phrase arising
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out of and used it advisedly when it was included in
Section 63-30-10(10)

Utah Code Annotated.

As applied to

the facts of this case, the phrase arising out of the
incarceration of a person would refer to an injury which is
in some way caused by one's incarceration or an injury
resulting from a risk to which a person is exposed by
reason of incarceration.

There is no such close causal

connection between the fact of incarceration and negligent
actions of medical personnel.

To say that incarceration

exposes one to the risk which caused the death of Plaintiffs'
decedent in this case is to say that substandard medical
attention and treatment are knowingly and intentionally
provided by the State of Utah to prisoners in the State Prison
and that such is to be expected and accepted as a consequence
of incarceration.
The cause of the injury in this case is not closely
connected with incarceration, but could have taken place
in any medical facility given the same type of negligent
acts complained of in Appellants' Complaint.

Even if a

causal connection is found, it cannot be seriously argued
that the decedent's incarceration contributed substantially
to his injury.
POINT III
THE INJURY TO APPELLANTS' DECEDENT IS NOT WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF EXCEP'riON 10 TO SECTION 63-30-10 AND THE
COURT ERRED IN SO APPLYING THE STATUTE.
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An examination of the legislative history of Utah
Code Annotated, §63-30-10 (10),

(the section preserving im-

munity if the injury arises out of the incarceration of any
person) shows that the Legislature of the State of Utah,
in enacting the Governmental Immunity Act, never intended
that subsection (10) apply to a situation like the present
one.
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was introduced
in the Utah Legislature in 1965 as Senate Bill No. 4.

The

bill was sponsored by Charles Welch, Jr. and M. Jenkins
(Senate Journal 1965 hereinafter referred to as "S.J. ").
appellants

ThE

request the Court to take judicial notice of the

Senante Journal for 1965.

(U.C.A.

78-25-l). Senate Bill No.

4 was introduced and read to the Senate on the lst day of
the session, January ll, 19 65, and was referred to the Rules
Committee for further consideration.

(S.J. p.32).

On the

second day of the session, it was printed and referred to
the Judiciary Committee.

(S.J. p.38)

The bill then went

through various readings and committees until it was placed
on the calendar for second reading of the bill on the lOth
day of the session, January 20, 1965.

(S.J. p.

136-137).

On that day, the Senate added several amendmCJnts to the orio.
bill.

One of those amendments was subsection (10) concerni~

the incarceration of persons in state prisons, etc.

FollovW

is the summary of those proceedings as printed in the Senate
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Journal of 1965, pp. 136-137:
.on m~tion o~ ~enator Welch S.B. No. 4 having
reta1ned 1ts pos1t1on on the Second Reading
Calendar, was now before the Senate.
On Motion of Senator Welch S.B. No. 4 was
amended as follows:
Page 3, Add subsection (10) to Section 10,
reading, "arises out of the incarceration of any
person 1n any state prison, county or city Jall
or other place of legal confinement, or."
(emphas1s added)
An examination of actual recordings of the con-

versations that took place of the floor of the Senate
during the adoption of the amendments to S.B. 4 provide the
listener with an insight into the actual discussion of the
Senate when adopting that amendment.
The discussion relating to the adoption of subsection (10) began by Senator Welch reading the proposed
subsection (10).

Senator Welch read the section very slowly

because the Senators had not been provided with copies of
the amendment previously.

After reading the proposed amend-

ment very slowly, Senator Welch then quickly read the entire
amendment again.
amendment.

Then he explained the purpose of the

A transcription of the discussion is as follows:

SENATOR WELCH:
"You can write it at the bottom of the page
if you want, and these are the words (read very
slowly) 'arises out of the incarceration of any
person in any state prison, county or city jail
or other place of legal confinement, or.'
Now
let me repeat that please. You will see that it
follows pretty well the language that is already
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on your printed amendments except just at the
beginning there are two or three extra words
in there, Mr. President."
(1-Jords in parenthesis
are editorial comments).
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:
"Would you repeat that paragraph Senator
Welch?"
SENATOR WELCH:
"I will, and if you will follow the language
in the printed ones you will see that I have just
added, we have just added two or three words here
to make it kind of follow the same language we
have had in respect to the other subsection.
(Whereupon Mr. Welch repeated the propsed subsection (10).
Now I can explain this very briefly, there
was the concern of some of our officials who have
to do with the state prison and other institutions,
unless we had this limitation in there they might
be beseiged with suits and that sort of thing of
persons who claim that~-ey~re-rni51:D2ated and
that sort of thing."
(emphasis added).
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE:
"Mr. President, I understand then on our page
2 amendment that we drop the balance of that, "shall
have a cause of action under the statute", is that
correct?"
SENATOR WELCH:
"Yes."

PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE:
"What he is doing is substituting the language
that he just dictated for the language that you have
on the amendment sheet."
(Recording of Senate Proceedings, Day 10, Jan. 20th, 1965, Part III, Side L
located in Lieutenant Governor's Office.)
The proposed amendments were voted upon and passed by the
Senate.

The bill was then sent to the House where it was voted u~
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on the 32nd day of session.

S.B. No. 4, as amended by the

Senate, failed to pass the House on that day.

The following

day, S.B. No. 4 passed the House after being amended.

The

amendments, however, did not involve subsection (10) of
section 10.

The bill then returned to the Senate where it

passed the Senate and was eventually signed into law by the
Governor.

The only discussion of the language in question

was a statement that the provision was added for the benefit
of prison officals and others who were afraid they would
be sued by "persons who claim they were mistreated."
Judicial interpretation has resulted in a similar
construction.

In Sheffield v.

~urner,

21 Utah 2d 314,

445 P.2d 367 (1968), the Cqurt said:
"There can be no question but that the maintenance
of a state prison and the keeping of prisoners
therein is a necessary auxiliary of government
and therefore, a governmental function, nor
that consequently the performance of the duties
incident thereto would normally be protected by
the traditional rule of sovereign immunity.
In
this connection it is appropriate to point out
that this does not constitute a carte blanche
protection for anythlng that may be done or permltted in a prlson.
On the other side of this proposition is the
imperative need for those in a supervisory capacity
to have reasonable freedom to discharge the
burdensome responsibilities of keeping in confinement and maintaining discipline of a large
number of men who have been convicted of serious
crime.
If such officials are too vulnerable to
lawsuits for anythlng untoward which may happen
to inmates a number of evils follow . . • "
(Emphasis added).
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As can be seen from the Court's analysis, the
basis purposes of immunity from injuries arising out of
incarceration are 1) to prevent prisoners from continually
harrassing official personnel with lawsuits; 2) to prevent
actions against the state for injuries inflicted by one
inmate upon another.
The injury to Thomas Madsen cannot, by any

reason~~

construction, be found to lie within either of these areas.
Death resulting from improper treatment and care is in no
respect similar to a suit against the prison because the
inmate's cell is too cold.

Nor is the injury one which has

been inflicted by a fellow prisoner.

The injury to the

deceased in this instance was inflicted by the act or omission of those whose assignment it was to look after him.
Since the injury to Thomas Madsen is not one which
falls within legislative contemplation or judicial construct
of the purposes behind exception 10 to Section 63-30-10,
Appellants contend that the exception is inapplicable in the
present case and the State is barred from denying the statut
waiver of immunity.
POINT IV
PRE-OPERATIVE AND POST-OPERATIVE TREATMENT OF THE
DECEASED WAS AN OPERATIONAL FUNCTION WHICH IS NOT WITHIN
THE COVER~GE OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 63-30-10(1).
Section 63-30-10(1) provides that:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived forinjury proximately caused by
a negligent act or omission of an employee
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committed within the scope of his employment
except if the injury:
(1)
arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function.
Absent the exception, the government has waived
its immunity from suit in actions such as the one at bar.
The issue then becomes whether the actions of the prison
officials and employees prior to, during, and after the
operation upon Thomas Madsen were of such a nature as to
be categorized as discretionary, and therefore, impose no
liability upon the State.
~~,

Respondents urge, citing Dalehite

346 u.s. 15, 73 s.ct. 956 (1953), that the negli-

gent acts of the prison employees and officials were pursuant
to the basic plan which established the prison hospital,
and as such were protected by the holding of that case.
The Dalehite opinion, however, recognizes the
existence of a distinction between discretionary and operational activities as they
governmental employees.

pertai~

to the action taken by

If we were to assume the position

urged by respondents, we would be hard put to find an
activity which could be classified as operational in nature.
Any action taken is somewhat objective in origin and requires
some degree of discretion.
~ar~oll v.

This court held in the case of

State Road Commission, 27 U.2d 384, 496 P.2d 888

(1972) as follows:
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. cvPry action of a government employee,
except a cond1t1oned reflex action, involved the
use of some degree of discretion.
The Court
observed that acts done in accordance with operationa] level decisions do not come within the
discretionary function exception.
The Court
stated that the conclusion may be drawn that operational level acts are those which confirm routine
everyday matters, not requiring evaluation of
'
broad policy factors.

*

*

*

. Consequently, the circuit court did
not error in holding that the state's negligence
in this case did not come within the discretionary
function exception." Carrol_l_'.T_-__~t_ate__J'(_?ad Comrnis~"!:_~n_ ib. at page 388, 399~-While appellants can see that the decision to
construct a prison hospital, and possibly even the decision
to allow Thomas

~adsen

to undergo the operation may be dis-

cretionary actions, the treatment
was operational.

involved with the ope ratio:

Certainly, in any medical facility, a

standard rule of good medical care must exist, and such
can always be measured objectively.
to

While the decision as

the quantity and/or type of two acceptable anesthetics

may be a subjective

choic~,

the decision to give a morphine

injection to a patient know to be suffering from a heart
condition is a knowing negligent act by any objective standar
To argue that the injury to Thomas t1adsen arose out
of a discretionary act is to say that it is a matter of
discretion in the prison administration whether or not to
provide decent and adequate medical care to the prisoners
incarcerated therein.

Specifically, it is to say that it is
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discretionary in the individual doctor or technician whether
or not to provide adequate medical care for individual
patient.

Obviously, this is not what was intended by the

legislature in an acting section 63-30-10(1) Utah Code
Annotated.

Clearly, a responsibility of a technician or

an orderly to make rounds and see that the patient's needs
constitute an operational function.

Also, the maintenance

of an oxygen unit to keep it in good working condition is
certainly an operational function.

Without a doubt, the

duty of an employee of a medical facility to check on a
patient who has had surgery that day after being informed
by someone else that that patient is having difficulty
breathing must be an operational function.

Therefore, the

injury to appellant's decedent Thomas Madsen did not arise
out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function and this action is therefore,
not barred by that provision.
POINT V
OPERATION OF A HOSPITAL FACILITY AT THE STATE PRISON
IS A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION \'ffiiCH IS NOT WITHIN THE COVERAGE
OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Surely there is no question that operation of a
prison facility by the State Government is a governmental
function.

Operation of a hospital facility, however, is

another matter.
533 P.2d 799,

In the case of Greenhalgh v. Payson City,

(1975), the Utah Supreme Court held that opera-

tion of a hospital facility by a municipality is a proprietary
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function and is not within the coverage of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

In the Greenhalgh case, the Court out-

lined four important factors to consider in deciding whether
an activity is proprietary or governmental.
are:

1)

Those factors

Whether the activity is something which is done for

the general public good.

2) Whether there is any special

pecuniary benefit to the municipality and, 4) Whether it is
of such a nature as to be in competition with free

enterpri~

One noticable difference between the Greenhalgh case and thio
case is that a municipal hospital accepts patients in return
for payment while the State provides medical services for ito
prisoners.

However, that is not entirely true since a public

hospital also accepts a large number of welfare patients and
medicare patients whose medical services are also

provided~

the government.
The important issue on this point is whether or not
maintenance of a hospital facility at which surgery may be
performed, etc. on the State Prison premises is to be regard;
as a public responsibility.

Apart from a routine pill dis-

pensory and first aid clinic, there is absolutely no necessi:
or responsibility on the part of the State to operate a
hospital facility at the State Prison.

Even with the presec

hospital facilities, prisoners are frequently sent to the
University Medical Center and other privately and independar
maintained hospitals for various medical services.

Had Ap-

pellants' decedent hroen permitted to have his surgery perfo'
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lc

3t one of

governmental immunity with regard to a claim of negligence
connected therewith.

0'

Therefore, since the State of utah

has chosen to maintain a complete hospital facility on the
Prison premises for its own convenience, maintenance of that
facility must be regarded as a proprietary function just as
if a similar facility were maintained and opened to the
public.

Another consideration was raised in the Greenhalgh

case, as well as in the case of Sessions v Thomas D. Dee
~1emorial

Hospital, 94 U. 460, 78 P.2d 645,

(1938), which is

the paramount public policy of encouraging a high standard of
case in a medical or hospital facility.

That principal should

be applied here in that if immunity is to be granted for any
and all acts of negligence which may occur in the hospital
facility on the part of doctors, nurses or technicians, there
is no way to encourage those who operate the facility to
exercise due care.

It is therefore, a matter of public

policy not to extend the principal of governmental irrununity
to the hospital facility.

t

,n'

those hospitals, there would not be a question of

POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS
AS TO DEFENDANTS SAMUEL H. SMITH, LEON HATCH, TAGE SPONBECK
AND DOE I THROUGH DOE V.
The lower Court found that the individual Defendants,
dS

well as the State and the Board of Corrections, were pro-

tected by the Section 63-30-10(10), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
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Therefore, the motion to dismiss as to the individual Defendants was also granted.
That motion, however, should only be granted where
there is no viable premise upon which the Plaintiff could
recover.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure #l2(b).

In the

case at bar, the requisite premise or theory still exists.
In Sheffield v. Turner, Supra.

In another case dealing witl

the meaning of "arising out of the incarceration", the Court
held:
. (T)he warden and other prison officers
are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity
against claims of negligence so long as they are
acting in good faith and within the scope of their
duties, and that they could not be held liable unless they were guilty of some conduct which transcended the bounds of good faith performance of the~
duty by a wilful or malicious wrongful act which
they know or should know would result in injury."
(Emphasls added) .
Appellant's pleadings in the lower court contained
allegations sufficient to create a triable issue of fact

~

to whether the actions of the individual defendants, while
possessed with knowledge regarding the seriousness of deceao
Thomas Madsen's physical condition both prior to and followi
the operation, were such as would constitute a wilful or
malicious wrongful act which they knew or should have known
would result in serious complications and probable injury.
If that issue were found in appellant's favor, then the jur
would have been forced to find for the Appellants and again'
the individual respondents.
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Therefore, the granting of the dismissal as to the
individual Defendants without adjudication upon the merits
of such claim constitutes reversible error.
A finding that the State is immune to suit in a case
such as this does not automatically require a dismissal as
to the individual Defendants.

Utah Code Annotated, Section

63-30-20 bars any action against the employee whose act
or ommission gave rise to the claim if judgment is rendered
against the State upon such claim.

That language offers no

connotation that if the State is held not to be liable,that
the claim against the employee is also dismissed.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, appellants submit that the trial court
erred in granting respondents' motion to dismiss on the basis
of governmental immunity.

Appellants' contend that Section

63-30-10(10), Utah Code Annotated is unconstitutional in
that it denies equal protection of the law.

Appellants also

contend that the death of Thomas Madsen was not an injury
"arising out of the incarceration" of the prisoner, Thomas
Madsen, rendering Section 63-30-10(10) inapplicable to this
case.

Appellants further contend that even if the statute

is found to be applicable, that such injury is not of the
type which the legislature of the State of Utah contemplated
as falling within the auspices of the statute when it was
enacted.

Finally, appellants assert that the negligent acts

of the respondents were of an operational, rather than a
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discretionary nature, and are, therefore, not controlled by
Section 63-30-10(1), Utah Code Annotated.

Even if the Court

finds that Appellants' claim against the State is barred by
the Governmental Immunity Act, the case should be remanded
to consider the liability which may still extend to the
individual respondents.
Appellants respectfully urge that the judgment of
dismissal by Third District Court be reversed and that this
case be remanded to the trial court for disposition on the
merits of the case.
Respectfully submitted,

AJ.~?Jl~
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN,
Attorney for Appellants
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